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Abstract: We investigate the relationship between outsourcing and profitability paying particular
attention to the endogeneity of outsourcing. The empirical analysis uses unique plant level data
for the electronics sector in Ireland. A particular feature of the data is that it records detailed
information for 12 electronics sub-sectors covering both manufacturing and services activities. We
distinguish outsourcing of materials from outsourcing of services inputs. We find that plants that
are substantially larger than the mean employment size benefit from outsourcing materials while
this does not appear to be the case for small plants. Results for outsourcing of services are not as
clear-cut, however.
I  INTRODUCTION
B
oth the popular press and academic literature have recently covered the
growth of outsourcing or contracting out, of business activities and its
economic implications. While Heshmati (2003) in his recent survey points out
that there is no general definition or measurement of outsourcing, he broadly
describes it as …different kinds of corporate action related to all
subcontracting relationships between firms and the hiring of workers in non-
traditional jobs (p. 99). Outsourcing may provide a viable strategy if firms aim
to save on labour costs (Abraham and Taylor, 1996), exploit production
differentials both within the services sector and between services and
manufacturing (Fixler and Siegel, 1999), or take advantage of globalisation
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Subcontracting as many non-core activities as possible is a central element of
the new economy.1
A fundamental question to ask is whether outsourcing is value enhancing
and, in particular, whether the firm that undertakes outsourcing shows higher
profitability as a result. Essentially this question renders down to the
transactions cost question regularly posed to university undergraduates:
should a firm manufacture its own inputs by some form of vertical merger or
should it seek to obtain possibly more competitively priced inputs on the open
market? While the viability of vertical mergers as a determinant of
profitability is comparatively well researched, less work has been undertaken
on the viability of pursuing a less integrated strategy, namely of outsourcing
inputs.2
Recent evidence from practitioners casts some doubt on the benefits to
outsourcing. A UK survey by Manpower focusing on the benefits accruing to
firms from offshoring services, found that 68 per cent of firms outsource at
least some services, the main motivation being cost reduction.3 However, in a
recent survey, 56 per cent of IT specialists claimed that outsourced IT work
was at least inferior to that produced in-house. More worryingly, 11 per cent
reported that the outsourced work actually induced a setback to the firm’s
production.4 Accordingly, in the popular press one appears to have arrived at
a point where experts begin to question the validity of outsourcing as a long-
term strategy or even short term as a cost reduction exercise. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only a very limited number of more
rigorous statistical or econometric studies looking at this issue. The evidence
that has been produced in such papers, however, suggests that the value-
enhancing link between outsourcing and profitability is not clearly
established. Specifically, Kimura (2002) does not find any evidence that
subcontracting leads to higher profits in Japanese manufacturing firms.
Differentiating between outsourcing of services and non-services inputs,
Görzig and Stephan (2002) find that outsourcing of materials is positively
correlated with profits, while there is a negative relationship between
profitability and outsourced services for a sample of German manufacturing
firms.
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1 Financial Times, 31 July 2001, p. 10. Feenstra (1998) provides an excellent overview of the
increase in outsourcing activities worldwide.
2 See Bhuyan (2002) for a recent analysis of whether vertical mergers induce higher profits or
Knarvik and Steen (2002) for an investigation of whether vertical mergers induce other positive
externalities through agglomeration effects.
3 http://www.manpower.co.uk/news/OutsourcingSurvey.pdf
4 Software Development Magazine, January 2004 issue.Motivated by the benefits to outsourcing claimed by some practitioners
and the corresponding lack of any direct evidence as to the truth behind these
assertions, we aim to establish whether outsourcing does indeed raise
profitability.5 We use unique plant level panel data for the electronics sector in
the Republic of Ireland. Ireland represents an interesting case study for
outsourcing as noted by Ruane and Görg (2001), who document the increasing
growth in outsourcing in the electronics sector for the Irish economy.6 The
novelty of our data stems from the fact that we can distinguish 12 electronics
sub-sectors which cover both manufacturing and services activities. Also, we
have detailed information on outsourcing activities at the plant level.
Furthermore, in comparison to the study by Görzig and Stephan (2002) which
is the one most closely related to ours, we pay particular attention to the
possible endogeneity of outsourcing and profitability. We attempt to
circumvent this problem by using an instrumental variable approach,
implemented using a General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section
briefly discusses recent literature on firms’ decisions to outsource, in order to
provide the context for our subsequent empirical analysis. The data are
described in Section III. Section IV outlines the econometric methodology and
discusses the results. Finally, Section V presents some conclusions. 
II  OUTSOURCING AND PROFITABILITY
Essentially outsourcing addresses the issue as to whether a firm should
make or buy intermediate inputs; an issue that has a long tradition in
economics, dating back to the seminal work by Coase (1937) on the boundaries
of a firm. Since then, a large body of literature has been concerned with
analysing the determinants of this “make-or-buy decision”, focusing on the
role of incomplete contracts, specific assets and transactions costs (e.g.,
Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Bolton and Whinston, 1993). In
a nutshell, firms would prefer to “buy” as opposed to “make” as long as the cost
of outsourcing is lower than in-house production. Hence, outsourcing can be
used to economise on production cost, in particular labour cost (Abraham and
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5 Note that, in this paper, we do not distinguish domestic from international outsourcing, but
concern ourselves with outsourcing in general. In a related paper, Görg et al. (2004) investigate
whether international outsourcing (imported intermediates) is associated with higher
productivity in the outsourcing plant, using data for manufacturing plants in Ireland. 
6 This growth was revealed using plant level data on input purchasing behaviour of computer
manufacturers where the ratio of bought-in materials to total sales has risen significantly over the
past decade, a sign that firms revert increasingly to outsourcing their inputs rather than opting
to produce them in-house.Taylor, 1996) by substituting in-house production with the buying-in of
components. The cost of outsourcing is not only determined by the price of the
bought-in components, but also by transaction costs due to transport and
incomplete contracting costs, and the possible implications of asset specificity
for supplier and/or customer. 
In a recent paper, Grossman and Helpman (2002) provide a comprehensive
theoretical analysis of firms’ outsourcing decisions. In their model, firms
decide whether to be vertically integrated or to outsource production of
components to specialised producers. This involves a search process, whereby
final good producers search for subcontractors and vice versa. There is
incomplete information – subcontractors cannot easily signal their quality –
and therefore a potential for a hold-up problem arises. Inter alia, Grossman
and Helpman (2002) show that the viability of outsourcing is determined by
the distribution of bargaining power between the two parties involved, the
degree of competition in the market, and the number of potential partners in
the market. 
Taking this as a theoretical background, one may expect that the benefits
from outsourcing are not always the same, but in particular depend on the
characteristics of the firm and industry in question. Large firms may be in a
better position to achieve high bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers and may
hence be better able to benefit from outsourcing. Also, large firms may face
lower search costs as they may be better established in the market and have
better knowledge of competitors and suppliers than small establishments. 
In terms of industry characteristics, if there are more potential
subcontractors in the industry, if the bargaining power is tilted towards the
final good producers, or if the level of competition is high among
subcontractors, final good producers are more likely to find outsourcing a
viable strategy. While this is difficult to address in formal empirical work (as
opposed to case studies) due to data constraints, our data set possesses one
advantageous characteristic that allows us to have at least a first cut at this
question. 
From our data set, we can distinguish outsourcing of tangible materials
and components from outsourcing of services activities. For the latter, one may
expect that many of the services are non-traded and therefore localised with
possibly only a small number of potential suppliers and low degrees of
competition. Hence, one may expect the benefits (if any) from services
outsourcing to be lower than the outsourcing of tangible (and tradable)
components. This theoretical prior is corroborated by Görzig and Stephan
(2002) who use German data for a sample of large companies to examine the
benefits of outsourcing. They find that firms that engage in materials
outsourcing experience benefits, in terms of increased returns per employee,
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This, they infer, is due to the non-transparent way in which outsourced
services are priced vis-à-vis more tangible inputs. They conclude that while
the markets for intermediate products appear to function, outsourced services
may be subject to certain inefficiencies.7
In related work, Kimura (2002) discovers that poorly performing firms
(low surplus to sales and low value added to sales) are more likely to use
subcontractors, in an analysis of the Japanese machinery manufacturing
industry. He concludes that profits are highest for those firms that do not get
involved in any type of subcontracting, whether as a supplier or as an
outsourcer. These results, accordingly, are in line with the findings for
Germany by Görzig and Stephan (2002).
III DATA
In order to investigate the relationship between outsourcing and profits
we use plant level data for the electronics industry in Ireland. This industry
has undergone rapid growth in the Irish economy, in particular in the 1990s.
As Ruane and Görg (2001) document, employment in the sector has increased
threefold between 1984 and 1997, from roughly 7,300 to 22,700. Most of this
growth arose during the mid-1990s; in 1994, total industry employment was
only approximately 11,700. One striking feature is that the majority of firms
operating in this industry are subsidiaries of foreign owned multinationals;
they accounted for over 85 per cent of employment in 1997. The importance of
multinationals in this sector is not least due to policies directed towards
foreign firms. Ruane and Görg (2001) note that the Irish Development
Authority (IDA Ireland) identified the electronics industry as a potential
source of growth for the Irish economy as far back as the mid-1970s. This
judgement was in part based on the perceived potential for outsourcing
activities in that sector. Such outsourcing potential was expected to raise the
scope for domestic Irish, as well as foreign companies to supply to final goods
producers, thereby allowing the location of various stages of the production
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7 Interestingly, they draw attention to the need to focus on profitability rather than efficiency
alone. Higher wages, while inducing higher efficiency (output per worker) lowered overall
profitability. This result was arrived at because the net effect of higher wages was to increase the
cost of labour inputs to an extent that diminished overall profitability. Hence efficiency, as noted
by Grossman and Helpman (2002), is not always the most appropriate indicator of how a firm is
performing. Girma and Görg (2004) provide a firm level analysis of the effect of outsourcing on
efficiency (i.e., productivity) in the UK. process in the country.8 Currently, electronics firms located in Ireland include
such high-profile names as IBM, Microsoft, Intel etc. 
The data used in this analysis are taken from the Irish Economy
Expenditure Survey, undertaken annually by Forfás, the government agency
with responsibility for enterprise development, science and technology. The
survey provides anonymised plant level information on output, employment,
profitability, nationality of ownership and industry, as well as details on
plants’ expenditure on labour, materials, and service inputs.9,10
The survey is sent out to all plants with thirty or more employees based in
Ireland in either the manufacturing or internationally traded services sectors.
Response rates are generally good; plants responding to the survey account for
around 60-80 per cent of employment of the target population each year
(O’Malley, 1995). The exclusion of small plants with less than 30 employees
from the sample, precludes us from investigating how outsourcing affects
small firms in particular, and this factor has to be kept in mind for the
subsequent interpretation of our results. 
While the survey has been undertaken by Forfás since 1982, an
examination of the data showed that for our purposes, information on
outsourcing and profitability has only been available since 1990. Accordingly,
we use electronics sector data for the period 1990 to 1995. These data are
classified into 12 sub-sectors of electronics, which cover both manufacturing
and service activities, making the dataset quite unique. These sub-sectors are:
Computers; Consumer Electronics; Electronic Components; Instrumentation;
Networking & Data Communication; Printed Circuit Board Assembly (PCBA);
Peripherals & Media; Semiconductors; Software Development; Software
Production; Telecommunications and IT Services.11 The inclusion of both
manufacturing and services sub-sectors makes the dataset particularly
interesting for our analysis.12 All in all, there are 215 plants included in the
sample, although the structure of the panel is highly unbalanced. 
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8 See also White (2000) for an excellent insiders-view on Irish industrial policy towards
multinationals. 
9 Unfortunately, the nature of our data does not allow us to distinguish between inputs sourced
from other plants within the same firm, and inputs sourced from other sources. 
10 All nominal variables are deflated using an output price deflator available from the Irish
Central Statistics Office. 
11 IT Services include IT related services not included in the other sub-sectors, such as Systems
Integration, IT Consulting and training and education.
12 The availability of data for this six year period is of course limiting, as fragmentation activities
can be expected to have expanded considerably over the last two decades. However, our data still
cover a period over which there has been variation in outsourcing activities, which we pick up in
our data. Also, this is the period over which there was a rapid growth of the electronics industry,
as discussed by Ruane and Görg (2001). The main variables of interest are outsourcing and profitability at the
level of the plant. The former is measured as the ratio of externally sourced
inputs to value added in the plant, thus giving us a measure of the importance
of bought-in intermediates in the production process. Specifically, we calculate
three measures of outsourcing. Total outsourcing is defined as the ratio of total
bought-in inputs over value added. As alluded to earlier, another advantage of
our data is that we can distinguish intermediate inputs into raw materials and
components (referred to as materials) and services inputs. We can therefore
calculate two more disaggregated measures of outsourcing, namely, the ratio
of bought-in tangible materials and components over value added, and the
ratio of bought-in services inputs over value added. With regard to the latter
measure, services inputs are comprised of other direct and indirect costs,
excluding materials, wages, rent, interest payments and depreciation. This
includes contracted out services, such as consultancy, maintenance, security,
cleaning, catering etc. An increase in these outsourcing ratios indicates an
increasing importance of outsourcing for production in the plant, as more
inputs are purchased for further processing. 
The measure of profitability is calculated as the ratio of net profits (i.e.,
total sales – total costs) over total output. Total costs includes all direct and
indirect costs accruing to the plant. Table 1 shows some summary statistics on
outsourcing of intermediary and materials inputs (O1) and services inputs
(O2) respectively. O1 is noted for its higher ratio of inputs to value added
compared to O2. It is possible that the higher ratios registered for O1 inputs,
are due to a higher degree of vertical integration in materials inputs vis-à-vis
services inputs. Overall, the median value of the O1 ratio just exceeds unity
(1.18) and the overall average ratio is 2.28, indicating that values in the upper
tail of the distribution are driving the average value up. The corresponding
values for O2 inputs are 0.40 and 0.97 respectively. We would expect services
inputs to exhibit lower values given their invariably ancillary function in
industry.13 However, firms with strong affiliations to suppliers in a value
chain, to the extent that they are fully integrated, should be expected to
register high values for the O1 ratio where components are purchased from an
intermediary.14
We are unable to disclose detailed summary statistics for the profitability
measure due to confidentiality reasons. The raw correlations between profits
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13 Abraham and Taylor (1996) outline types of business services received and include supportive
services such as accounting, auditing and bookkeeping and services to buildings in addition to
more direct inputs such as personnel supply services. 
14 In Table A1 in the Appendix we present further summary statistics for the two outsourcing
measures, disaggregated by the electronics sub-sector. The figures show that there is a wide
variability in the extent of outsourcing across electronics sub-sectors.and  O1 and profits and O2 are –0.13 and –0.16 respectively, and the
correlation between O1 and O2 is 0.21 (all statistically significant at the 1 per
cent level). 
In Table 2 we present further summary statistics for the outsourcing
variables, as well as for average employment and the capital-sales ratio (which
are covariates included in the empirical model below). We distinguish the
overall means, as well as means for ‘high profitability’ and ‘low profitability’
plants in order to highlight differences between these two groups of plants. For
illustrative purposes, the former category is simply defined as plants
demonstrating at least median profitability levels, while low profitability
establishments are those with less than median profitability. As we can see,
highly profitable firms tend to use more outsourcing in general. A simple t-test
for the equality of means for the two groups of plants can be rejected. Note,
however, that low profitability plants are on average larger (in terms of
employment levels) than the other group of plants. 
The differences in outsourcing usage between these two groups of plants
are further highlighted in Figures 1 to 3. These graphs chart the distribution
of outsourcing intensities of plants in high and low profitability categories for
total, materials and services outsourcing respectively. The accompanying table
containing the actual proportions used to generate these cross-sections is
contained in Table A2 in the Appendix.
If low and high profitability plants demonstrated no difference in
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Table 1: Breakdown of Outsourcing to Value Added Ratios for O1 and O2
Year O1 Materials and Intermediate Product Inputs
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Median Obs
1990 2.04 5.28 27.88 1.07 82
1991 2.01 6.55 42.95 1.11 111
1992 1.81 2.22 4.94 1.12 120
1993 3.43 10.96 120.2 1.2 114
1994 1.96 2.63 6.92 1.19 116
1995 2.44 3.96 15.69 1.29 114
O2 Services Inputs
1990 0.77 2.03 4.14 0.4 82
1991 0.90 2.83 8 0.38 131
1992 1.20 5.87 34.41 0.36 122
1993 1.28 4.27 18.23 0.4 131
1994 0.81 1.25 1.55 0.44 131
1995 0.88 1.42 2.01 0.42 131
Source: Own calculations based on Irish Economy Expenditure Survey data.outsourcing intensity, they would both register equal proportions (i.e. 50 per
cent) across all intensity quartiles. However, we see that certain biases emerge
depending on (a) the nature of the outsourcing and (b) the level of the
outsourcing intensity.  Accordingly, we see in Figure 1 that of those
establishments engaged in high level outsourcing (4th quartile), a dis-
proportionate number (62 per cent) belong to the low profit group. Overall
therefore, outsourcing appears to be an activity in which low profit plants are
particularly active. 
Moving to Figures 2 and 3, we now examine the composition of
establishments according to the nature of outsourcing i.e. whether we are
dealing with materials or services outsourcing respectively.  Consistent with
what we have seen in Figure 1, a disproportionate percentage of plants in the
highest intensity category (4th quartile) belong to the low profit category. This
proportion is 60 and 68 per cent for materials and services outsourcing
respectively. Accordingly, the nature of the outsourcing activity does matter. It
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Table 2: Comparison of Outsourcing Intensity and Other Control Variables
Across High and Low Profit Plants
p-value for  No. 
t-test that Obs
–        – xhighprofit = xlowprofit
Low High Overall
Profitability Profitability  Mean (unequal variance 
Mean Mean Mean assumed)
Std. Std. Std.
Materials 
outsourcing (outs1) 1.49 3.19 2.29 (0.0007) 657
1.718 8.534 6.040
Services 
outsourcing (outs2) 0.58 1.42 0.98 (0.0011) 728
1.065 4.715 3.40
Total 
outsourcing (outs3) 1.96 4.20 3.05 (0.0007) 728
2.203 12.136 8.675
Capital-sales ratio 0.49 0.47 0.48 (0.5380) 632
0.395 0.424 0.410
Employment 214.88 83.46 150.96 (0.0000) 728
272 136 227
Source: Own calculations based on Irish Economy Expenditure Survey data.appears that of plants actively engaged in high level outsourcing,
disproportionately more exhibit low profitability.
This profits discrepancy is more striking when non-tangible as opposed to
tangible inputs are outsourced, a fact we infer from the disproportionate
percentage of low profits plants engaged in services outsourcing. Staying with
the issue of services outsourcing, accompanying the disproportionate activity
of low profit plants in the fourth quartile, is a relatively weak showing in the
lowest outsourcing intensity category (1st quartile). Here we see that a mere
23 per cent of establishments belong to the low profit group while a
disproportionate proportion (77 per cent) belong to the high profit category.
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Figure 1: Net Profits by Total Outsourcing Intensity
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Figure 2: Net Profits by Materials Outsourcing IntensityIV  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
The analysis of simple summary statistics does, of course, not allow us to
isolate the possible effects on profitability of other covariates. In order to
disentangle the effect of outsourcing and other factors on plant profitability,
we turn to an econometric analysis. We start off with a profit function which
we formulate in levels in order to explain profitability in plant i at time t, Πit
ln Πit = β1 + β1Oit + β2 ln ksrit + β3 ln employit + β3 ln netgrjt
+ αj + νt + µi + εit (1)
where Oit is one of the measures of outsourcing as defined above, ksrit is the
capital-to-sales ratio (where capital is measured as capital employed, i.e.,
working capital), employit is establishment size measured in terms of
employment, and netgrjt is the net annual growth rate (measured in terms of
employment) of the electronics sub-sector j. Furthermore, αj and vt are full sets
of sector and time dummies, µi is a plant specific time invariant effect, and εit
is the remaining error term which allows for heteroskedasticity as well as an
unspecified correlation within but not across establishments.15
It is important to point out that the specification in (1) is not based on any
particular theoretical framework. It is thus of a purely descriptive nature and
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Figure 3: Net Profits by Services Outsourcing Intensity
15 The plant specific effect captures, inter alia, the nationality of the plant in order to allow for the
possible profitability advantage of foreign-owned plants (e.g., Kumar, 1990). meant to give some indication as to what attributes impact on plant
profitability. Profits, of course, depend on barriers to entry (e.g, Shepherd,
1972, Domowitz et al., 1987). The capital-to-sales ratio is, therefore, included
in the model in order to control for differences in profits across plants that are
due to differences in capital intensity. Also, it is frequently found in the
literature that large firms are more productive and more profitable than small
establishments (e.g., Audretsch, 1995), hence, we control for establishment
size in the empirical model. The sectoral net growth rate is included in order
to account for the fact that fast growing industries may allow plants to reap
higher profits, as additional entry in a growing industry may not affect
incumbents’ profits negatively. 
In order to purge the time invariant sector and plant specific effects from
the estimation we first difference the equation and obtain
∆ ln Πit = λ1∆Oit + λ2∆ ln ksrit + λ3∆ ln employit + λ4∆ netgrit + νt + uit (2)
From the discussion in Section II we would not expect the coefficient λ1 to be
equal across different establishment types. In particular, we may expect
differences in the returns to outsourcing for small and large plants. In
particular, large establishments may be in a better bargaining position than
small establishments vis-à-vis their suppliers and, hence, may be better able
to reap benefits from outsourcing. In order to allow for this difference we
interact ∆O with log employment size in the empirical implementation of the
model. One further point to note is that by estimating Equation (2) on our six
year panel we can only capture short-run effects of outsourcing on profitability.
This should be kept in mind for the interpretation of results. 
The results of simple OLS regressions of Equation (2) including the
interaction term are presented in columns (1) to (4) in Table 3. Column (1)
shows the results for estimating Equation (2) including total outsourcing,
whereas columns (2) and (3) distinguish outsourcing of materials and
intermediate components from outsourcing of services activities, as defined in
Section III. Column (4) presents results including both materials and services
outsourcing jointly. 
Examining, firstly, the coefficients on the explanatory variables, we find
that employment size of the plant shows the expected positive signs, although
the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The sectoral growth rate also
returns statistically insignificant coefficients. Surprisingly, the capital-to-
sales ratio returns a statistically significant negative result. This is contrary
to expectations, if ksr is taken as a proxy for barriers to entry. However, much
of the entry by foreign firms into Irish manufacturing has been in capital and
technology intensive industries (see Barry and Bradley, 1997); this entry
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findings.16
Turning to the results on the effect of outsourcing on profits, we observe a
negative effect from total outsourcing. However, the positive and statistically
significant coefficient on the outsourcing and (log) employment size
interaction term shows that for larger plants increased outsourcing is
associated with higher profits. This also holds when distinguishing materials
and services outsourcing, see the results in columns (2) and (3). However,
when including both materials and services outsourcing jointly in the
estimation, then the signs on services outsourcing switch, while materials
outsourcing still returns the same result (column 4).17 This indicates that
there are important interactions between services and materials outsourcing.
When controlling for materials outsourcing, there are no benefits from
services outsourcing for large firms. 
Before interpreting these results further we need to address an
econometric concern. Specifically, one potential problem with the estimations
in Table 3 is that there may be a potential endogeneity problem in the
profitability-outsourcing relationship that is not accounted for. For example, it
may be the case that badly performing plants decide to outsource part of the
production process in order to boost profits further, or that further unobserved
variables drive the outsourcing-profitability relationship. In order to deal with
this issue we instrument for the outsourcing intensity variable O using its first
and second lags. The equation is estimated using a Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM) estimator. 
The results for estimating (2) using the GMM estimator are reported in
Table 4 for total, materials and services outsourcing respectively. We report
the Hansen J statistic to examine the null hypothesis that the correlation
between the instrumental variable candidates and the error terms in Equation
(2) is zero; a necessary condition for the validity of the instrumental variables
approach. We are also careful to assess the strength of the relationship
between the instruments and the potentially endogenous regressors. It has
been noted in the econometric literature that when the partial correlation
between the instruments and the endogenous variable is low, instrumental
variables regression is biased in the direction of the OLS estimator. Staiger
and Stock (1997) recommend that the F-statistics from the first stage
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16 Unfortunately, with the data at hand we are not able to investigate this issue further. However,
the negative coefficient on ksr is persistent and striking in our results. 
17 One possible explanation may be that this is driven by the fact that there are 28 observations
less in column (4) than column (3). To address this point we re-estimated the model in column (3)
using the 340 observations only. This does not change the results and, hence, cannot explain this
switch in signs. regression be routinely reported in applied work. The F-statistic tests the
hypothesis that the instruments should be excluded from the first-stage
regressions (i.e., the relevance of the instruments). The idea here is that when
the F-statistic is small, the instrumental variable estimates and the
associated confidence intervals are unreliable. 
The Hansen test does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of
instrument validity, while the F tests also indicate that the instruments are
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Table 3: Results from First Differenced OLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total outsourcing –0.027
(0.008)***
Total outsourcing *
employment 0.004
(0.001)***
Materials outsourcing –0.039 –0.084
(0.009)*** (0.019)***
Materials outsourcing * 0.006 0.015
employment (0.002)*** (0.004)***
Services outsourcing –0.077 0.118
(0.038)** (0.050)**
Services outsourcing * 0.012 –0.025
employment (0.007)* (0.009)***
Capital-sales ratio –0.044 –0.048 –0.047 –0.047
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Employment 0.014 0.015 0.008 0.022
(0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Sector growth –0.001 0.000 –0.001 –0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 368 340 368 340
R-squared 0.58 0.62 0.51 0.65
Notes: Response variable is profitability (first differenced).
Regression includes time dummies and constant term.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.relevant. We note, however, that the F-tests are only marginal in the case of
services outsourcing in column (3), hence we are cautious in interpreting those
results. Overall, however, we can be reasonably confident that our results are
valid. Furthermore, the Hausman test, which examines the null hypothesis
that there is no statistically significant difference between the OLS and IV
estimates, suggests that the GMM estimates are only preferred in the case of
total outsourcing in column (1) and when jointly including materials and
services outsourcing in column (4). 
Turning to the coefficients we find similar results in columns (1) to (3) to
the first differenced OLS regressions discussed earlier. However, the
coefficients are in all cases somewhat larger. However, as pointed out above,
for the analysis of materials and services outsourcing we prefer the OLS
estimates in columns (2) and (3) to the GMM estimates. From column (4) we
now find that once we control for materials outsourcing, there are no
statistically significant profitability enhancing effects from services
outsourcing. Materials outsourcing still benefits large plants, however. Note
that this finding is in line with Görzig and Stephan’s (2002) study which finds
from German micro data that materials outsourcing benefits firm
performance, while there is no such evidence from services outsourcing.
Taking the coefficients at face value, column (4) suggests that establishments
start to benefit from materials outsourcing once they reach a size of 262
employees. Recalling that the mean employment level is around 150 (Table 2),
this suggests that only plants considerably larger than the mean size are able
to benefit from outsourcing.
Taken together, our results suggest that only large plants are able to
improve their performance in terms of profitability following increasing use of
outsourcing of material inputs. In the framework of the Grossman-Helpman
(2002) model discussed in Section II, this may indicate that these large
establishments have more bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers and are
therefore able to extract rents. This appears to be not the case for smaller
plants in the electronics industry. Another possible explanation is that large
firms face lower search costs for potential suppliers since they may be better
established on the market, and hence be in a better position to benefit from
outsourcing. Unfortunately, with the data at hand, we are not able to
investigate these issues further. The results for services outsourcing are less
clear-cut, however. When looking at services outsourcing we find benefits for
large plants, similar to materials outsourcing. However, once controlling for
materials outsourcing, there are no such benefits evident. One important
caveat to keep in mind is that we investigate the short-run effects of
outsourcing on profitability. Given the potential obstacles for small plants they
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Table 4: Results from GMM Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total outsourcing –0.138
(0.048)***
Total outsourcing *
employment 0.023
(0.009)***
Materials outsourcing –0.184 –0.206
(0.072)** (0.068)***
Materials outsourcing * 0.031 0.037
employment (0.012)** (0.017)**
Services outsourcing –0.516 0.088
(0.290)* (0.206)
Services outsourcing * 0.127 _0.030
employment (0.073)* (0.062)
Capital-sales ratio –0.052 –0.054 –0.043 –0.056
(0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.019)***
Employment 0.030 0.034 0.006 0.036
(0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.020)*
Sector growth 0.002 0.004 –0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Observations 282 268 282 268
F first stage (p-value)
Total outsourcing 0.001
Total outsourcing * employment 0.000
Materials outsourcing 0.000 0.00
Materials outsourcing  
*employment 0.000 0.00
Services outsourcing 0.12 0.03
Services outsourcing  
*employment 0.15 0.01
Hansen J (p-value) 0.34 0.44 0.64 0.22
Hausman (p-value) 0.01 0.70 0.34 0.00
Notes: Response variable is profitability (first differenced).
Regression includes time dummies and constant term.
Instruments used are first and second lags of the outsourcing variable in levels.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.may only be able to benefit in the medium to long run, while large plants may
be better able to reap the benefits in the short run. 
V  CONCLUSIONS
We  analyse empirically the relationship between outsourcing and
profitability at the level of the plant, using data for the electronics sector in
the Republic of Ireland. Our results suggest that the profit/outsourcing
relationship depends on characteristics of the plant, in particular its size. We
find that plants that are substantially larger than the mean employment size
benefit from outsourcing materials inputs, while this does not appear to be the
case for small plants. Within our empirical analysis we are not able to explain
this size disadvantage, although we can speculate on the basis of the
theoretical work by Grossman and Helpman (2002) that this reflects higher
transaction costs for small plants. In particular, they may face lower
bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers and/or higher costs in searching for
adequate suppliers. The benefits from services outsourcing are less clear-cut,
however. When interpreting these results one needs to keep in mind that our
empirical methodology implies that we are essentially analysing short-run
effects. Due to the relatively short period of data covered we are unable to
examine the long-run effects of outsourcing on profitability. 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics for O1 and O2 by Sub-sector
1990 1995
O1
Components 1.53 (0.46) 2.59 (2.11)
Computers 1.67 (1.67) 2.51 (2.77)
Consumer Electronics 1.74 (0.78) 2.34 (1.78)
Instrumentation 3.18 (5.72) 2.08 (1.42)
Networking/Data Com 2.57 (0.09) 1.97 (1.22)
PCBA 10.36 (23.86) 2.83 (2.35)
Peripherals & Media 2.42 (0.87) 5.00 (5.53)
Semiconductors 2.85 (2.16) 6.87 (7.39)
IT Services 1.62 (1.08) 0.72 (0.58)
Software Development – 1.67 (2.61)
Software Production – 6.15 (11.54)
Telecommunications 2.26 (1.91) 4.48 (5.49)
O2
Components 0.70 (0.41) 1.28 (0.21)
Computers 0.86 (0.52) 1.96 (2.17)
Consumer Electronics 0.96 (0.32) 0.99 (0.44)
Instrumentation 0.89 (0.45) 1.23 (0.86)
Networking/Data Com 1.76 (0.68) 0.91 (0.16)
PCBA 0.89 (0.78) 1.46 (0.96)
Peripherals & Media 1.26 (0.56) 1.61 (2.15)
Semiconductors 1.23 (0.01) 3.82 (4.33)
IT Services 0.43 (0.52) 0.48 (0.41)
Software Development – 0.29 (0.41)
Software Production – 1.31 (1.78)
Telecommunications 1.03 (0.62) 1.61 (1.05)
Note: Means (Standard deviation in parentheses).
Source: own calculations based on Irish Economy Expenditure Survey data.
286 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWTable A2: Breakdown by Quartile for Low and High Profit Plants
Low profit High Profit Total
Total O/S Intensity (proportion of plants)
1st quartile 47 53 100
2nd quartile 41 59 100
3rd quartile 50 50 100
4th quartile 62 38 100
Materials O/S Intensity (proportion of plants)
1st quartile 54 46 100
2nd quartile 40 60 100
3rd quartile 46 54 100
4th quartile 60 40 100
ervices O/S Intensity (proportion of plants)
1st quartile 23 77 100
2nd quartile 48 52 100
3rd quartile 61 39 100
4th quartile 68 32 100
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